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RICHES TO RUBLES: PROBLEMS RUSSIA MUST
ADDRESS TO INCREASE DIRECT INVESTMENT
FROM U.S. PRIVATE EQUITY
Conaire Michael Hallisy*
"The strengthening of our statehood has sometimes intentionally been interpreted as
authoritarianism. ,,t
- Vladimir Putin
I. INTRODUCTION
Private equity investments in Russia are increasing. However, due to
inadequate protections for shareholders, limited partnerships structure their
investments in intermediate offshore holding companies, typically avoiding
direct investment into Russia.3 Consequently, in an attempt to increase direct
investment into Russian companies and in response to the global outcry to
provide greater protection for shareholders, Russia has implemented numerous
rounds of amendments to the Law on Joint Stock Companies (JSC Law). 4
J.D. Candidate May 2009, University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma. Thank you
Mom for instilling in me at a young age a love for writing. Thank you Dad for teaching me the
true meaning of work ethic. Thank you Jennifer for your love and patience throughout this long
process. A great deal of gratitude and appreciation is due to Mr. Christopher Rose, Esq. for his
technical assistance and advice throughout the paper writing process. Last but not least, I would
like to thank the Candidates, Staff and Editorial Board of the Tulsa Journal of Comparative and
International Law for all their hard work and long nights spent on the publication.
1. Seth Mydans, Putin Accuses Critics of Working for Foreign Powers, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2004, at A I0 (quoting former Russian President Vladimir Putin).
2. HOLLY A. NIELSEN, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, PRIVATE EQUITY IN RUSSIA 1 (2003),
http://www.altaassets.com/casefor/countries/2003/nz3808.php.
3. Christopher Rose, Inside Russian Private Equity Funds, 18 RUSs./EURASIA EXECUTIVE
GUIDE 2 (2008).
4. See Olga Lazareva, Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, A Survey of Corporate
Governance in Russia 34 (Centre for Econ. & Fin. Res. at New Econ. Sch., Working Paper No.
103, 2007).
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Amendments to JSC Law have in some cases undermined shareholders rights,
led to additional abuses, and have been largely ineffective due to a lack of
enforceability of shareholder agreements in Russia.5 Rampant corruption and a
judiciary that is often biased in its interpretations against foreign investors also
negatively affect direct investment into Russian companies. Even where
judgment is impartial the amendments to JSC Law are complex and
multilayered, which does not bode well for a judiciary that has failed to keep
pace with the changes in economic legislation.
7
Russia must confront these problems before making additional amendments
to JSC Law.8 If the Russian Duma9 implements further amendments, it could
create more problems and perpetuate an already ineffective system. 10  Russia
must be patient and allow the current amendments time to trickle down through
the civil law system and take effect.'' Prior to making additional amendments to
JSC Law, Russia should work to resolve the problems within its judiciary by
strengthening enforcement mechanisms and confronting the corruption that
exists at all levels. 12  Until these problems are addressed, private equity will
continue to invest through intermediate offshore holding companies, and direct
investment into Russia will suffer. 13
This comment explains why U.S. private equity uses intermediate offshore
holding companies when investing into Russia. It then analyzes three problems
5. Robert E. Langer, Marc E. Gold & Mark A. Stoleson, Private Equity Investing Under
Russia's Amended Law on Joint Stock Companies, METRO. CORP. COUNS. (Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer, & Feld, L.L.P., New York, N.Y.), May 2002, at 6; see also Lazareva et al., supra note 4,
22-24 (one example of such an abuse is an increase in hostile takeovers by corporate Raiders in
Russia).
6. See US & FOREIGN COM. SERV., US DEP'T OF COM., DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA: A
COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR US COMPANIES ch. 6, § Corruption (2005) [hereinafter USDC].
7. See Digest of Commercial Laws of the World: Russia: Digest, 2005 Digest § Rus., at 2-6
[hereinafter Russia: Digest]; see also DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FISCAL & ENTER. AFFAIRS, OECD,
THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: LAWS, POLICIES, AND INSTITUTIONS
16 (200 1) [hereinafter OECD].
8. See Langer et al., supra note 5, at 6; see also Rose supra note 3, at 2; Russia: Digest supra
note 7, at 2-6; Lazareva et al., supra note 4, at 33-34.
9. See BUREAU OF EUR. & EURASIAN AFFAIRS, US DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
RuSSIA passim [hereinafter USDS] (The Duma is the legislative branch in Russia which makes up
part of the central government comprised of the eighty-eight regional subunits. The Duma, similar
to the US House and Senate, must vote to enact legislation.).
10. See USDC, supra note 6.
11. Derek A. Bloom et al., Coudert Brothers L.L.P., Corporate Takeovers, Russian Style: How
to Defend Against Them (Mar. 28, 2003) (unpublished article, on file with Tulsa Journal of
Comparative & International Law).
12. Id.
13. See Rose, supra note 3, at 2; see also William Judge & Irina Naoumova, Corporate
Governance in Russia: What Model will Follow? 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 302, 303 (2004).
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that Russia must address prior to making additional amendments to JSC Law and
how addressing these problems may increase direct investment from private
equity into Russian companies. Section II of this comment will provide a brief
summary of private equity. Section III will offer a general overview of the
current state of private equity in the United States. This section will then briefly
explain how the current subprime lending crisis has threatened the U.S. private
equity market and why private equity has begun to look abroad to Russia.
Section V will provide a general overview of the state of private equity in
Russia. Moreover, this section will explain the use of offshore intermediate
holding companies by U.S. limited partnerships and the consequences to direct
investment in Russia. Section V will provide an analysis of the three main
problems that Russia must address before enacting additional amendments to
JSC Law. Additionally this section will discuss what strategies Russia should
implement to solve its problems. Section VI will conclude and briefly
summarize the changes that Russia needs to put into effect in order to increase
direct investment.
Finally, it is important to keep in perspective that while the problems this
article addresses are of primary importance, they are only half of the solution
needed to increase direct investment from private equity into Russia. 14 A limited
partnership seeking to invest in Russia will often make decisions largely driven
by tax. 15 This article will not concentrate on the tax implications that must be
considered by private equity when contemplating a direct investment into
Russia. The tax issues are complex and are beyond the scope of what could be
covered in this article.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE EQUITY: THE PLAYERS, LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP AND TRANSACTION
In order to understand private equity in a more thorough manner, this paper
will begin with a brief explanation using a metaphor that even the least savvy
businessperson is sure to understand-the lemonade stand. Imagine you own a
lemonade stand. You sell regular lemonade. The stand is doing well. You
charge 10¢ a cup. You have a positive cash flow and make $2 dollars a week.
The market around your neighborhood is above average. You work a square,
four-corner block in City X, suburbia USA. The two comers on the east side'of
your block border a busy street so they do not matter; you never make any
money there. The west side is where the money is. On the northwest comer,
there is a trailhead next to a parking lot. Your house is adjacent to this trailhead,
so you are able to obtain ice easily from your refrigerator and can provide a cold
14. Langer et al., supra note 5, at 6.
15. Id.; see also Rose supra note 3, at 2.
20081
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cup for customers. Money here is ok. There are a steady number of soccer
moms jogging in the morning, middle school bike traffic in the afternoon, and
the businessperson in the early evening looking to shed those extra pounds.
On the northeast comer is an untapped market, Memorial Park, which
boasts some of the city's best basketball and tennis courts. The only trouble is
that they are around four hundred yards from your house on the opposite side of
the park. While you can make it to Memorial Park, your lemonade is warm by
the time you get there, and no one wants a warm glass of lemonade on a hot day.
Thus, you rarely sell a cup and decide your time is better spent focusing on the
trailhead, but you can dream.
After some time, you realize that you are now barely breaking even. You
decide that the park is the only option to save your business. However, there is
still the problem of keeping the ice from melting and of keeping your lemonade
cold. You do some research and find out that there are some power outlets next
to the basketball courts. After looking through the Sunday classifieds, you find
an ad for a small portable refrigerator. You want to buy the fridge, but it costs
$100 dollars. You have nowhere near this kind of money. You are ten so you
do not have the credit to obtain a loan from the bank, yet you know with some
additional financing your lemonade stand will really start to grow and turn some
major profit.
You decide to seek financing through your older brother. Having run many
lemonade stands in his day, he is intrigued by your idea of expanding into the
park. He agrees to finance the deal but is concerned about your management of
the stand. He has a business degree and contacts in the Memorial Park
basketball leagues and believes that with his skills he can ensure that the
expansion is a success. In return for his investment he would like stock in the
company and a managerial role with the stand to ensure his investment is highly
profitable. You agree, but want to structure the arrangement in an agreement
that lays out the rights and responsibilities of each party. He agrees and together
you enter into an agreement and the expansion moves forward.
Although this example is an oversimplified version of private equity, it is
an example that is easily understandable and holds some of the basic concepts
within private equity. Private equity is a wide-ranging term that refers to
different types of investments.16 What these different types of investments have
in common are an exchange in which private companies receive medium to long-
term financing while investors receive a stake of equity in a company. 17 A
private equity fund provides the financing and, in exchange for their capital,
16. DANIEL LEE & MATT SWARTZ, THE CORPORATE, SECURITIES, AND M&A LAWYER'S JOB 19
(Int'l Legal Publishers ed., 2007).
17. KEITH ARUNDALE, BRITISH PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, A GUIDE TO
PRIVATE EQUITY 6 (2004).
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receives shares of the company's stock. 18 The shares of stock held by the private
equity fund become partially owned by the investors who supply the capital for
the fund to operate. 19  As a result, the investor shareholders' returns are
dependent on the success of the company. This sounds as though it is no
different from a mutual fund, in which there is the purchase, holding, and sale of
stock in a company; therefore, it is important to have a general understanding of
some areas involving private equity in order to distinguish it from other types of
investing. 2 1 First, it is important to understand the players involved in a private
equity transaction. 22  Second, it is necessary to be familiar with the limited
partnership structure to understand how the players interact. 23 Finally, a brief
discussion of the typical private equity transaction will help to distinguish
private equity from other types of investing.
24
A. The Players
In a typical private equity transaction, there are three main players and a
number of minor ones. 25  The three main players are the intermediaries, the
investors, and the investee company. 26 The first player is the intermediary.
27
An intermediary is comprised of institutional investors (investors) and
professional private equity managers (managers), 28 who are part of a private
equity firm. Henceforth, because the managers are typically part of the private
equity firm, together they will cumulatively be referred to as the "fund." 30
18. LEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 19; see also Daniel E. Larkin, Mara L. Babin & Christopher
A. Rose, Structuring European Real Estate Private Equity Funds, 3 BRIEFINGS IN REAL EST. FIN.
229, 229-235 (2003).
19. LEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 19.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE ECONOMICS OF
THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 3-5 (1995).
23. Id. (For purposes of the page restriction on this paper, my primary focus will be the
Limited Partnership. There are other organizational structures that are used for the intermediary
structure however "[flrom 1980 to 1994, the amount of capital under management by the
organized private equity market increased from roughly $4.7 billion to about $100 billion, and
limited partnerships went from managing less than 50 percent of private equity investments to
managing more than 80 percent.").
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 4 (noting that "Issuers" is the name used by the authors; however, for the purposes of
this paper, I will refer to "Issuers" as either "prospective company" or "investee company".).
27. Id.
28. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
29. See id.
30. See id.
2008]
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An intermediary primarily takes the form of a limited partnership,.31 Under
a limited partnership, there are limited partners and general partners. The fund
acts as the general partner while the investors act as the limited partner. 33 There• • •34
are two primary types of private equity funds. The first type is a subsidiary of
a larger institution.35 These subsidiaries are usually a division that specializes in
private equity within the larger institution.36 An example of this type of private
equity fund would be an insurance company that has a private equity division.
37
The second type of private equity fund operates as an independent entity* 38
that does not belong to a larger institution. This type of private equity fund's
sole purpose is private equity. 39  Both types of private equity funds have
managers who are representatives of their funds and oversee investment within
the investee companies.
4 0
The general partner decides where and how to invest the limited partner's
capital. 4 1 When a fund recognizes an investment opportunity, they obtain capital• • 42. ..
from the limited partner. The general partner specializes in negotiating,
31. Id. (noting that Limited Partnerships "manage an estimated 80 percent of private equity
investments.").
32. LEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 67-68
(Limited partners are shielded from personal liability for the partnership's
obligations. General partners of limited partnerships are personally liable for the
obligations of the general partnership. Each limited partnership must have at
least one general partner. Limited partners who participate actively in the
management of the business risk being deemed general partners by law.).
33. See id.; see also FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
34. JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
TRANSACTIONS 102 (Martin D. Ginsburg et al. eds., 2006).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
41. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 103.
42. LUDOVIC PHALIPPOU & MAURIZIO ZOLLO, WHARTON FIN. INST., WHAT DRIVES PRIVATE
EQUITY FUND PERFORMANCES? 4 (2005), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/05/0541.pdf, see also Jonathon Baird & Karen Fountain,
Private Equity Funds: US and UK Features, PRACTICAL L., May 23, 2003, at 7,
http://crossborder.practicallaw.com/5-102-3098
(Limited partners are asked to commit a specific amount of capital when they
subscribe for an interest in the fund. The capital contributions will be used to
make fund investments and pay fund expenses. Limited partners will not
generally be asked to contribute all ... of their capital commitment at the time
of their initial subscription .... Instead, a fund will call for, or drawdown,
[Vol. 16:1
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organizing, and monitoring equity investments in investee companies.4 3  Most
private equity funds specialize in a specific industry or stage in company
development.44 Specialization allows private equity funds to become experts in
recognizing prospective investee companies with potential for large growth.4 5 It
also enables a fund to take corrective measures to ensure that investee companies
maximize their performance. 46
The second type of player in a private equity transaction is the investor.47 ItS 48
is important to recognize there are different types of investors. Depending on
the type of investor, this can affect the strategy of a fund. 49  Some of the
different types of investors in private equity include insurance companies,
corporate pension funds, public pension funds, university endowments,
foundations, bank holding companies, wealthy families and individuals,
investment banks, non-financial companies, and other private institutions.
50
Although the investor is also the limited partner and part of the intermediary,
5 1
their primary purpose is to provide capital so the managers of the private equity
fund can make investments.
52
In exchange for their capital, investors anticipate a considerable return on
their investment. 53  When the managers decide to invest, they will typically
divide any profit from the investment between the fund and the investors.
54
capital contributions, on an as needed basis, generally as the fund makes
investments, and commonly on ten days' notice.).
43. See PHALIPPOU ET AL., supra note 42, at 4; see also Baird, supra note 42, at 6.
44. DAVID E. VANCE, RAISING CAPITAL 143 (2005).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3; see also Grace Wong, A Handy Private Equity Cheat
Sheet, CNN MONEY, Mar. 30, 2007,
http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/30/markets/pe_cheat-sheet/index.htm.
48. See FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 5.
49. See id.; see also Baird, supra note 42, at 16 (stating:
ERISA is a significant concern for any fund, whether or not located in the US,
that proposes to raise money from US pension plans or other US employee
benefit plans. In order to protect participants in employee benefit plans, ERISA
imposes strict fiduciary standards on the management of plan assets. In the case
of a private equity fund with an ERISA plan as an equity investor, these may
include all the fund's assets.).
50. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 4.
51. Id. (explaining that institutional investors act as the limited partner in the limited
partnership structure).
52. Levin, supra note 34, at 102.
53. LEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 19.
54. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 102.
20081
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Managers of the fund receive one to three percent of the invested assets.55 This
is incentive for the managers to ensure the investee company is a success.56
Prior to investment the limited partner and the general partner agree on the
amount of profit each will receive in a partnership agreement, but typically,
partners allocate profit in a 20/80 split.57 Before paying the split, the fund will
pay back investors their capital contribution. 58 Then 20% of the net profit goes
to the fund. 59  This entitlement is also known as carried interest. The
remaining 80% of the net profit then goes to the investors.
61
The third type of player in a private equity transaction is the investee
62
company. Private equity firms are usually interested in companies that have a
high potential for growth and can offer the prospect of turnover within five
years.63 The characteristics of the pros Pective companies are typically low-risk
companies with a positive cash flow, 6and although these characteristics vary
amongst investee companies, they all usually share the common trait of being a
company that is in need of financing.
65
This is where the private equity firm will often step into the equation and66
provide the financing needed. Generally, there are four types of investee
55. VANCE, supra note 44, at 143.
56. Id.; see also Wong, supra note 47.
57. See Baird, supra note 42, at 8.
58. See id.
59. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 102.
60. The Taxation of Carried Interest: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 6
(2007) [hereinafter CBO] (quoting statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget
Office as saying,
[a] general partner in a private equity ... is typically compensated in two ways:
through a fixed management fee and a share of profits... [t]he second
component of the general partner's compensation is a share of the profits on the
assets under management ... [t]hat component, which is often 20 percent of
such profits, is usually referred to as carried interest, or, simply, carry);
see also Baird, supra note 42, at 8-9 (explaining that carried interest is usually disproportionate to
the amount of the funds capital contribution it is this profit entitlement that is the funds incentive to
see that the investee company and the investment is a success).
61. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 102.
62. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
63. ARUNDALE, supra note 17, at 6-9.
64. LEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 19; see also Mike Wright & Ken Robbie, Venture Capital and
Private Equity: A Review and Synthesis, 25 J. OF Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 521, 538-39, (1998) (noting
that in a study by Muzyka the criteria that private equity funds look for in a company were (i) good
management team, (ii)reasonable financial return, and (iii) good market characteristics for the
product or service).
65. See FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
66. See LEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 19-20.
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companies that private equity provides financing for: the new venture, the
middle market company, a company that is in financial distress, and a company
for sale.
67
The first type of investee is the new venture. 6 8 A new venture can mean
one of two types of companies.69 In the first type, a group of investors organizes
a new company known as a start-up, whereas the second type is a company
that is already established but is in an early stage. 71 In both instances, the
companies are young but have potential and need private equity to supply the
capital for growth.72  These types of situations are more typical for venture
capitalists. 73
The second type of investee is the middle market company.74 The middle
market company is usually a well-established company that is much larger than
an early stage venture company. 75 It is stable and profitable, 76 and unlike other
investee companies typically has the assets and credibility to borrow against and
obtain financing through bank loans. 77 However, the middle market company is
normally not able to obtain enough financing for its objectives. 78 The objectives
that middle market firms generally seek are to change capital structure with new
ownership, or to finance expansion. 79  Private equity provides the financing
needed for either expansion or money to cash out the existing owners. 8 0
The third type of investee is a company that is in financial distress. The
reasons companies perform poorly vary, but in this type of situation, the private
equity firm takes on more risk than with a company that is stable and has a
67. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 1; see also LEVIN, supra note 34, at 103.
68. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 17.
69. Id.
70. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 105.1.
71. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that an early stage company is one that is in the
research and development stage, shows potential for very high growth in the future, but needs
capital to develop more rapidly).
72. See id.
73. Id.; see also LEE ET AL., supra note 16, at 19 (explaining that "[v]enture capital funds
characteristically invest in higher risk, higher-potential-return investments, sometimes start-ups or
companies with no cash flow.").
74. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 18-19.
75. Id. at 3 (explaining that a middle market company is "roughly defined as companies with
annual sales of $25 million to $500 million..
76. Id.
77. Id. at 19.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 19.
81. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 105.3.
2008]
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positive cash flow. 82 There are two types of companies in financial distress:
private companies and public companies. 83  A private company usually is
overleveraged s4 and needs financing to pay off loans. 85 A public company in
financial distress is not able to access the debt market. 86 Accordingly, it is easier
to negotiate a loan with a private equity firm in exchange for an interest in the
87
company.
The final type of investee is a company that is for sale. 88 In this type of
situation, private equity provides financing to a buyer to purchase the89 90
company. There are usually three potential types of buyers. The first is a
strategic buyer, who already owns a company similar to the prospective
company and wants to acquire the prospective company in order to merge the
two and produce an increase in value.9 ' The second is a long-term buyer who
wants to purchase the prospective company to move into the company's
industry.92 The third and final type of buyer is the financial buyer, who wants to
acquire, improve, and sell the prospective company, with the final goal to make a
profit in seven to ten years.
93
B. The Limited Partnership
While the players involved in private equity are important, it is necessary to
elaborate on the limited partnership structure in order to understand how the
players interact. The limited partnership is the primary reason for the increase in
capital94 and success of the private equity market.95 There are two primary types
of partnerships, a limited partnership and a general partnership. 96  Under a
82. Id.
83. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 19.
84. See id. at 20 (explaining that a company is overleveraged when "they show positive
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)").
85. Id.
86. Id. (explaining the debt market is comprised of bank loans, private placement, or private
bonds).
87. Id.
88. See LEVIN, supra note 34, at l 105.3.
89. Id. at 105.4.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See LEVIN, supra note 34, at 105.4.
94. FEN ET AL., supra note 22, at I (explaining that "[f]rom 1980 to 1994, the amount of
capital under management by the organized private equity market increased from roughly $4.7
billion to about $100 billion, and limited partnerships went from managing less than 50 percent of
private equity investments to managing more than 80 percent.") (footnote omitted).
95. Id.
96. LEE ETAL., supra note 16, at 67.
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general partnership, there are only general partners, each of which is personally
liable for the debts and obligations of all the partners and the company.
Under a limited partnership, there are one or more general partners and one
or more limited partners.9 8  General partners are liable for the debts and
obligations of the company and the other partners. 99 However, limited partners
are only liable to the company for their capital contribution and are not liable for
the debts and obligations of other partners.I°0 A partnership agreement between
the limited and general partners controls the relationship and normally calls for
the general partner to oversee management of the partnership. 01 Limited
partners may not participate in management of the company.102
Although there are other structures that players in the private equity market
can enter into, none has worked as efficiently in the United States as the limited
partnership. 10 3  This is in part due to the pass through taxation that limited
partnerships receive. 104 Under a pass through taxation structure, income of the
limited partnership is untaxed and "flows through" directly to the investors.
10 5
Upon liquidation of an investment by the private equity firm, investors shoulder
individual taxes on their share of the profit. 106 Although the tax benefits of a
limited partnership are important, the structure is conducive to success as
well. 1
0 7
As discussed earlier, the limited partnership allows intermediaries to act asS 108
general partners on behalf of the limited partner investors. This relationship
maximizes efficiency by enabling the general partners to identify, structure, and
manage companies. 109 The general partners also provide a small percentage of
97. RICHARD HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 16 (5th ed. 1980).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Larkin et al., supra note 18, at 229-35.
102. HAMILTON, supra note 97, at 17.
103. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 1.
104. Marco V. Maotti, Private Equity Funds: Current Terms and Trends Annex: Sample Term
Sheet, AM. SEC. L. WORKSHOP 2007, PLI Order No. 10866 at 217 (2007).
105. J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC.: IN A
NUTSHELL 195 (3d ed. 2005).
106. Bridget Barker & Mark Baldwin, Structuring Pan-European Private Equity Funds,
PRACTICAL L., Sept. 1,2001.
107. LEVIN, supra note 34, 103.
108. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 1.
109. LEVIN, supra note 34, 103.
2008]
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the capital."l 0  The limited partners provide the remainder of the capital
investment. 
11I
The duration of the limited partnership is finite. 112 The usual lifetime of a
limited partnership lasts ten years; however, an extension of up to four more
years is available. 113 In the course of the first three to five years, the limited
partnership invests capital in the prospective company. 114 At this stage, private
equity distinguishes itself from other types of investing 15 because the general
partners actively manage and influence the operations of the company.116 They
accomplish this through their financial, operating, and market expertise.
11 7
Some common modifications that general partners make are securing additional
capital for the company, hiring top management, taking an active role on the
board of the company, solving operational problems, evaluating company
expenditures, and developing a long term strategy for the success of the118
company. These services provided by the general partners are what
distinguish private equity from other types of investing. 119
C. The Transaction
A limited partnership provides financing in exchange for a stake in the
investee company. 12  The stake the limited partnership receives from the
-- 121
investee company is more complex than simple debt or equity securities. The
securities provided by the investee company to the limited partnership are
usually in the form of one of the following: common stock, 122 preferred stock, 123
dividends, 124 interest payments, or stock appreciation. 12 5 However, the favored
110. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 28.
111. Id.
112. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 103.
113. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 29.
114. Id.
115. Id. at34.
116. Id. at29.
117. Id.
118. Id. at34.
119. FENN ET AL., supra note 22, at 34.
120. See VANCE, supra note 44, at 142.
121. Mitchell Berlin, That Thing Venture Capitalists Do, 21 FED. RESERVE BANK OF
PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV. 15, 21 (1998).
122. See generally id. (explaining that common stock is the residual ownership interest in the
investee company).
123. See HAMILTON, supra note 97, at 660 (explaining that the definition of preferred shares are
"shares that have preferential rights to dividends or to amounts distributable on liquidation, or to
both, ahead of common shareholders").
124. See id. at 649 (explaining that the definition for dividend is "a distribution to shareholders
from or out of current or past earnings").
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medium of security issued by investee companies to limited partnerships is
convertible preferred stock. This type of security provides the strongest
incentive for both the limited partnership and the investee company to ensure
that the investment is a success. Although these types of securities help to
align the interests of both the investee company and the limited partnership,
there are still a great number of risks in the investment. 128 To help control these
risks, limited partnerships enter into a shareholder agreement in which they
negotiate for a series of rights. 129  A shareholder agreement governs the
relationship between the investee company and the limited partnership. 3 0  A
shareholder agreement contains key provisions that provide security for the
125. VANCE, supra note 44, at 143.
126. See generally Berlin, supra note 121, at 21-22 (explaining the benefit of convertible
preferred stock:
Like a debt contract, preferred stock requires the firm to make fixed payments
to the stock's holder. And the promised payments must be made before any
common stockholder gets dividend payments, that is, the preferred stockholder
has priority over common stockholders. Hence, the [fund] can make sure that
the [investee company] is not paying himself a high salary disguised as
dividends. It also means that if things turn out badly and the firm is liquidated,
the [fund] gets back her investment in the firm before the [investee company]
gets paid anything.
Unlike preferred stockholders in many other settings, the [fund] usually has
voting rights. In addition, the [fund] usually has a right of redemption, which
means that she can cash out her shares at some predetermined price whenever
she wants. Along with the fixed payments, both of these features give the
[fund] multiple levers of control- as well as a way to make a quick exit if
prospects look bad.
With so many features that increase the [funds] influence, a well-designed
contract should also have features leading her to use this influence in sensible
ways. This is where the convertibility feature comes in. The right to convert
her financial claims into shares of common stock focuses the [fund's] attention
on the firm's market value. Since the firm's common stock will be valuable
only if the firm does well, the [find's] vision is fixed on maximizing the value
of the firm's stocks and ensuring that the firm succeeds. In particular, any
incentive to cut her losses and run too quickly is reduced. (Footnotes omitted)
(alteration to original)).
127. Id.
128. VANCE, supra note 44, at 148 (explaining that an investment has many risks including,
technology risk, competitor third parties, lack of management skill or management incompetence,
egos of owners of investee companies, finding the right company, market strategy).
129. Id. at 149; see also The Trouble With Private Equity, THE ECONOMIST, July 7, 2007, at 11
[hereinafter Trouble].
130. Simon Beddow, Private Equity and Buyouts: Overview, PRACTICAL L., Nov. 20, 2007, at
23, http://www.practicallaw.com/0-l107-4033.
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limited partnership until exit. 131 It can provide restrictions on what the investee
company's management can do with the investee company without consent from
the limited partnership. 132  To ensure greater security in their investment the
limited partnership can negotiate restrictive covenants. 133  The agreement
typically provides restrictions on the investee company's shareholders not to sell
their shares in the company to third parties. 134  The agreement can provide a
requirement that the shareholders of the limited partnership and the investee
company follow the articles of association in any newly formed entity.135 The
agreement contains warranties and representations made by the investee
company to the limited partnership. 136 If the limited partnership is the majority
shareholder, it is typical that the limited partnerships insist that the other
shareholders including the investee company enter into "drag along"
agreements. 137  In the alternative, if the limited partnership is the minority
shareholder, it can obtain "tag-along" rights. 138
Finally, and possibly most important, is that a shareholder agreement allows
shareholders to have a seat on the board of directors. 139 This allows the limited
partnership to have a stronger position in the investee company, giving them
access to inside information, the ability to actively participate and influence
management, and to take part in the decision making process. 14  All of the
rights that a limited partnership negotiates in a shareholder agreement are a
131. Id.
132. Id. (explaining that this is what is known as veto rights).
133. Id. at 24 (explaining that a restrictive covenant is used "to prevent the [investee companies]
management from engaging in competing businesses or soliciting customers, suppliers or staff for
a period of time following completion of the investment and/or them ceasing to be an employee of,
or shareholder in' Newco").
134. Id. at 23.
135. Beddow, supra note 130, at 23-24.
136. Id. (explaining that there are different types of warranties, some of the most common
include: warranties that the management of the investee company will follow the business plan
provided by the limited partnership; warranties that the investee company confirm that it provided
accurate information to the limited partnership during the due diligence period; a warranty that
there was an agreement of a duty by the investee company's management to not breach the terms
of the shareholder agreement).
137. LEVIN, supra note 34, at ch. 9, 9-3 to 9-4 (A drag along right gives the limited partnership
the right to find a buyer or several buyers for all or part of the investee company's stock and binds
the investee company and other shareholders to cooperating in the success of the transactions.).
138. Id. (explaining that a tag-along right will give the limited partnership the right as a minority
shareholder to sell their stock alongside the majority shareholders if they decide and have the right
to sell their stock in the investee company).
139. VANCE, supra note 44, at 149.
140. Id.
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means to an end and merely help to manage risk to meet the final objective of
exiting an investment. 
14 1
An exit is the manner in which a limited partnership realizes its investment
in an investee company. 142 An exit strategy is usually in place even before the
limited partnership enters into a deal with an investee company. 143 The goal of
the limited partnership's strategy is to maximize the value of the investee
company and then to liquefy the investment for a profit. 144 There are different• . ,145
ways to exit an investment. The most common exit strategies used in a
private equity transaction are an initial public offering, 14
6 secondary buy-out, 147
S ,148 149
a trade sale, or a company buy-back. With any of the exit strategies
selected it is important that the limited partnership structure their rights from the
very beginning of the transaction through a shareholder agreement. This is to
ensure that the limited partnership is able to maintain its rights throughout the
investment and exit. 15 1 Often times upon exit from an investment, shareholders
in the investee company disagree with the limited partnership on an issue or may
not be completely satisfied with the outcome of the investment. 152 However,
because of the negotiated rights in the shareholder agreement, the limited
partnership is able to enforce its contractual rights. 153 Shareholder agreements
141. Id. at 149.
142. Id. at 150-52.
143. AltAssets, Glossary of Private Equity and Venture Capital Terminology,
http://www.altassets.com/hm-glossary.php [hereinafter ALTA] (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
144. LEVIN, supra note 34, at ch. 9, 9-3.
145. ALTA, supra note 143.
146. Id. (noting that "An IPO is the official term for 'going public'. It occurs when a privately
held company-owned, for example, by its founders plus perhaps its private equity investors -lists a
proportion of its shares on a stock exchange").
147. Id. (noting that when one private equity fund sells its interest in a investee company to
another private equity fund it is called a secondary buy-out).
148. LEVIN, supra note 34, at 9-3 (explaining that a trade sale is a sale of the investee company
to a larger company in exchange for either stock in the larger company or cash or a combination of
the two."); see also VANCE, supra note 44, at 153 (explaining that a trade sale will either occur to a
publicly traded or privately held company. In both cases it is typical that the publicly or privately
held company wants to take over the investee company to consolidate a specific industry and by
taking over the investee company it can gain a stronger hold on the market in the specific
industry).
149. ALTA, supra note 143; see also VANCE, supra note 44, at 153 (noting that a company buy-
back is where the limited partnership sells its stock back to the investee company).
150. See LEVIN, supra note 34, at ch. 9, 9-3, see also Christopher Rose, Don't Be the Second
Little Pig, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 2008, at 9, available at
http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/private-equity-and-venture_capitaUPEVCR01 .pdf.
151. See LEVIN, supra note 34, at ch.9, 9-3 to 9-4.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also Rose, supra note 150, at 9.
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are largely unenforceable in Russia, and this is a primary reason why U.S.
limited partnerships structure their investments through intermediate offshore
holding companies. 154
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
With each decade comes a new iconic figure that becomes the face of
American Capitalism. During the 1980s, black Lincoln Town Cars chauffeured
Wall Street investment bankers to and from their thrones on Wall Street. 155 The
venture capitalist dominated the 1990s and threw the world into a "dot com"
boom. 156 As the millennium passed it seemed as though the hedge fund manager
- • .. 157
would be the new rock star, but that changed with the rise of private equity.
The ascent to eminence for private equity has occurred at a rapid pace.
The role of private equity on financial markets began as a trend but has since
become a financial staple. 159 Statistics from Thompson Financial support the
emergence of private equity in the U.S. markets and abroad. 16  In 2004,
worldwide private equity increased by 40% over 2003, with $78.5 billion in
private equity deals. 16  The growth continued in 2005 to $86 billion worldwide,
with a 32% increase in U.S. private equity activity over 2004.162 In 2006,
growth continued with US private equity buyouts totaling $414.6 billion.
163
Investors spent $1.56 trillion on mergers and acquisitions in the U.S., 164 of
which 25% were private equity buyouts. 165 Furthermore, 2006 earned the mega-
deal title, largely due to the size of the deals accounting for the vast sum of the
growth, but the majority of the money came from private equity deals. 166
According to the Practising Law Institute, "[i]n 2004 private equity deals
accounted for 31 of the 131 U.S. deals in the $1-10 billion dollar range, and for
18% of the value of such deals."' 167 This amount increased in 2005 with private
154. Rose, supra note 3, at 2.
155. Nicholas Varchaver, Private Equity in 2007, FORTUNE, Jan. 22, 2007, at 21.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See David A. Katz, Takeover Law and Practice 2007, 1643 PLI/CORP. 855, 866-872
(2008).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Rik Kirkland, Private Money, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2007, at 50.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Katz, supra note 159, at 871.
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equity transactions accounting for almost a third of the deals in the $1-10 billion
range, roughly 27% of the value. What is more staggering is that this trend
has continued with private equity fundraising efforts in the U.S. last year
accumulating a record $156 billion in new capital, and according to
Blackstone, 16 9 the global fundraising effort has accumulated $400 billion that is• 170
ready for investment. In terms of private equity, $400 billion leveraged
represents 17 1 almost $2 trillion in potential buying power. 172
However, there are two reasons why these numbers are misleading, and
further, why private equity in the U.S. and more developed markets is likely to
face serious obstacles. 173 First, as described above, private equity has raised
record amounts of money. 174 This is partially because there are more private
equity firms now than ever before. 175 Therefore, although there are record levels
of fundraising and more private equity funds in the market, there is still the same
• 176
amount of opportunity to create deals. This means more competition, fewer
deals to spread around, and consequently, lowered potential returns. 177  The
markets are expanding and looking east the U.S. market and into countries
where private equity is relatively new.1875
Second, leverage is not as readily available as in the past. 179 Leverage,
structuring deals using debt, is the primary reason why private equity is enjoying
its high levels of success. 18  This is largely due to lenders providing cheap debt
168. Id.
169. See generally Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall Street's Man of the Moment, FORTUNE, Mar. 5,
2007, at 74-78 (explaining that Blackstone is the top ranked private equity firm in terms of overall
value and leadership).
170. Kirkland, supra note 164, at 50.
171. RVCA YEARBOOK 2004, RVCA PUBL'N (2005),
http://www.rvca.ru/eng/show-info.php?=l 8.
172. Kirkland, supra note 164, at 50.
173. Trouble, supra note 129, at 11.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Plenty of Alternatives: But Hedge Funds and Private Equity have their Limits, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2008, at 11-12.
178. Trouble, supra note 129, at 11; see also Following the Era of Large Buyouts, Private Equity
Funds find New Ways to Compete, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON, May 6, 2008,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfmarticleid=1 953 [hereinafter WHARTON].
179. WHARTON, supra note 178; see Kelly Candaele, The Dangers of Private Equity Funds, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at M5; see also Anthony Hilton, Stand By for a New Subprime Crisis, THIS
IS MONEY, June 3, 2008, available at
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/columnists/article.html?in-article_id=432235&in-page-id= 19
&inauthorid.
180. Varchaver, supra note 155, at 21.
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to private equity funds because of more relaxed loan restrictions. 181 This is
abruptly ending due to the sub-prime lending crisis in the United States and its
effects on the debt market. 182 Where borrowing was once easy for private equity
funds, rising long-term interest rates and restrictions on loans have decreased the
amount of debt available to create leverage opportunities. 183 Creditors around
the world have begun to restructure the way they lend as well, and the global
private equity market has suffered. 184 While the rest of the world has felt the
credit crunch, Russia seems to be a country that has remained largely unscathed
by the effects of the subprime crisis. 185 Many growing Russian companies are
now unable to obtain the financing needed to expand and, consequently, have
turned to private equity for help. However, historically Russia has not
provided adequate protection to shareholders, which is of primary concern to
• ., 187
private equity. As a result, direct investment has been low; Russia has
attempted to increase direct investment by amending JSC Law to provide for
greater protections for investors. 188 These amendments have been unsuccessful
as the majority of limited partnerships invest through offshore holding
companies, instead of directly into Russian companies. 189
IV. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RUSSIAN PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
The subprime lending crisis continues to devastate mature markets
throughout the world. 190 The financial chaos has struck mature markets much
harder than emerging markets. 191 The growing Russian economy has yet to feel
the impact and private equity investors speculate that the Russian market is a
181. Id.
182. Trouble, supra note 129, at 11; see also Hilton, supra note 179.
183. Hilton, supra note 179; see also WHARTON, supra note 178.
184. See generally Trouble, supra note 129, at 11 (explaining that the sub-prime crisis has
affected many deals throughout the world, in Australia because of the high cost associated with
debt private equity firms pulled out of the country's biggest takeover deal; in Britain the sale of a
large retailer was left dead after the withdraw of two large private equity funds); see also
WHARTON, supra note 178.
185. Langer et al., supra note 5, at 6.
186. Id.
187. See Michael D.V. Coco, Towards Enterprisation: Shareholder Rights and Economic
Reform in Russia, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 169, 169-81 (1998).
188. Id. at 188.
189. See Rose, supra note 3, at 2.
190. Christopher Rose, Private Equity and Venture Capital: Doing Deals in Russia: The
Headlines are Encouraging but Read the Small Print, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, Jan. 2008.
191. Laura Kodres, Supreme Fallout: Vulnerability Up in Some Emerging Markets, IMF SURVEY
MAG., Sept. 24, 2007; see also WHARTON, supra note 178; Rose, supra note 190.
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safe haven.192 On a macroeconomic level, foreign investment doubled in 2006
and doubled again to $50 billion in 2007.193 Russia has the fastest growing IT
industry in the world and is predicted to grow twenty percent annually.' 9 4 The
labor force is inexpensive and highly skilled. 195 Russia has massive oil and gas
resources. 196  On a microeconomic level, 85 million Russians had sufficient
disposable income in 2008 to afford consumer goods, making Russia the largest
consumer market in Europe. 197 Additionally, Russia's development in the equity
capital market among the central and eastern European countries makes it the
region's financial center. 198 The economics of the post-Soviet market have been
a catalyst for the private equity market during the last ten years in Russia. 1
99
This surge in the area of private equity is largely due to a decade of
economic reforms in Russia that has led to the privatization of many state owned
companies. 20 These formerly state-run companies responded to the
transformation by attempting to acquire capital to expand in an effort to keep
pace with the new market-driven economy.201 Private equity answered the call
and provided the additional financing needed. 20 2 Not only did private equity
provide the financing that facilitated the rapid growth, it also grew with the
number of general partners in Russia having doubled and total assets rising from
less than $500 million to over $5 billion over the course of the decade. 203 The
majority of private equity investment is still in middle market companies, largely
due to the expansion of the Russian economy and the privatization of formerly
state-owned companies.
2 04
192. Rose, supra note 190.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. APAX PARTNERS, UNLOCKING GLOBAL VALUE: FUTURE TRENDS IN PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTMENT WORLDWIDE 23 (2006).
196. Id.
197. Rose, supra note 190.
198. NIELSEN, supra note 2, at 1.
199. Id.
200. Robert Langer & Marc Gold, Russian Issuers Return to the International Capital Markets
(Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Field L.L.P., New York, N.Y.), Aug. 26, 2002, available at
http://www.altaassets.com/casefor/countries/2002/nz3096.php; see also NIELSEN, supra note 2, at I
(noting that since 1994 more than 80 percent of the Russian economy is privately owned and the
"government continues each year to sell off its remaining stakes in the major companies").
201. Langer et al., supra note 200.
202. See id.; see also CIS Private Equity Report, (Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P & C5,
London, Eng.), Nov. 14, 2007 [hereinafter CIS].
203. Rose, supra note 3, at 2.
204. David Wack & Christopher Rose, Private Equity 2006/07: Russian Federation: Country
Q&A Russian Federation, PRACTICAL L., Nov. 1, 2007, at 235.
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When investing in Russia, U.S. limited partnerships in most instances do
not directly invest in an investee company as they would in the United States.
205
Instead, most Russian private equity investments by U.S. funds are through a
limited partnership in an offshore jurisdiction. 20 6 Although Russian law offers
the legal structure for U.S. limited partnerships to invest directly in a Russian
company, most U.S. investors find the provisions under Russian law to be
.,207
unacceptable. This is largely because under Russian law, shareholder
agreements afford little protection should there ever be a dispute between the
Russian investee company and the U.S. limited partnership. 208 As noted earlier,
a shareholder agreement is especially important in a private equity transaction
due to the finite period of the deal and the level of cooperation needed between
the limited partnership and the investee company from the initial investment
until exit.
20 9
Although the limited partnership in an offshore jurisdiction still provides
the same stability as in the United States, 2 1 this is irrelevant if the rights
provided by the shareholder agreement between a limited partnership and
Russian investee company are not legally enforceable. 2 1 1 Consequently, when
structuring a deal with a Russian investee company, a limited partnership will
typically use an offshore holding company as an intermediary. 2 12  The
shareholders of the limited partnership and the shareholders of the Russian
investee company create the offshore holding company as a separate entity.
2 13
205. Rose, supra note 190.
206. Rose, supra note 3, at 2; see also HILTON MCCANN, OFFSHORE FINANCE 15 (2006) (An
offshore jurisdiction
holds itself out as a financial services centre that enables financial services
companies to conduct financial transactions-mainly with non-residents. The
identity and the business of the clients will be regarded as confidential. The
infrastructure of the jurisdiction is likely to include a benign fiscal regime that is
underpinned by a tailored legislative, financial and regulatory environment.).
207. Rose, supra note 3, at 2; see also Posting of Dan Primack's Interview with Michael
Bleyzer, CEO of private equity firm SigmaBleyzer, Private Equity and the Russia-Georgia
Conflict, http:/fblogs.reuters.com/reuters-dealzone/2008/08/15/private equity-and-the-russia-
georgia-conflict/.
208. Rose, supra note 190.
209. See VANCE, supra note 44, at 149; see also Gilles Chemla, Michael Habib & Alexander P.
Ljungqvist, An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements 1-3 (RICAFE- Risk Cap. & the Fin. of
European Innovative Firms LSE, Working Paper No. 006, 2004).
210. See MCCANN, supra note 206, at 76 (stating that a limited partnership in an offshore
jurisdiction still includes: limited liability for investors, pass through taxation, and an efficient
partnership structure between investors and the fund).
211. Rose, supra note 3, at 2.
212. Rose, supra note 190.
213. Rose, supra note 150, at 9.
[Vol. 16:1
RICHES TO RUBLES
Thus, instead of investing directly in a Russian company, the limited partnership
shareholders will convince the Russian shareholders to bring their shares to the
offshore jurisdiction to form the new holding company entity.2 14 The primary
offshore jurisdictions that U.S. limited partnerships use to invest in Russia are
the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey.
215
The limited partnership creates the offshore holding company in one of the
above jurisdictions for two primary reasons. 2 16 First, by structuring the limited
partnership in one of the above foreign jurisdictions, U.S. limited partnerships
receive greater flexibility because of more established and favorable corporate
laws.217 Of particular importance is the right of the limited partnership to have
their negotiated rights in the shareholder agreement enforced.
Second, if the limited partnership were to invest directly in a Russian
company, as a foreign entity that receives Russian sourced income, the limited
partnership would be subject to Russian withholding tax. 2 19  However, by
forming an intermediate holding company in an offshore jurisdiction, 220 the
limited partnership can take advantage of the jurisdictions double taxation
treaties in effect with Russia.22 1 Estimates place some $6.5 trillion of assets
offshore, which account for nearly sixty percent of the world's money.222
Cyprus is usually the most favored jurisdiction, used for both its corporate laws
and its favorable tax treaty for private equity funds investing in Russia.
223
214. Id.
215. See Wack et al., supra note 204, at 236; see also Rose, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that
"[t]hese jurisdictions are typically favoured above others because of their advantageous tax
regimes and because they are familiar to most foreign investors"); Rose, supra note 150, at 9.
216. Rose, supra note 150, at 9.
217. Rose, supra note 3, at 2.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. (explaining that an intermediate holding company is used because as "Russian
sourced income received by a foreign entity other than through a permanent establishment in
Russia may be subject to withholding tax... , fund investments are often made through Cyprus,
Luxembourg or Dutch holding companies which can take advantage of double-taxation treaties in
effect with Russia.") (text omitted); see also Russia and Offshore: Foreign Investors in Russia,
LOWTAX.NET, http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/offon/russia/rusoffshore.html [hereinafter
LOWTAIx] (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
221. See LOWTAX, supra note 220; see also Rose, supra note 3, at 2.
222. McCann, supra note 206, at xi.
223. Rose, supra note 3, at 2 (stating:
Under the Cyprus-Russian tax treaty, Russian withholding tax on dividends is
reduced to 5% if the Cyprus holding company invests at least USD $100,000 in
its Russian subsidiary companies. Cyprus imposes a 10% income tax on the
Cyprus companies income. However, the Cyprus company would be able to
reduce this 10% tax by half through a credit for the 5% Russian tax. Cyprus
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Cyprus was reportedly the largest foreign investor in Russia, investing nearly
$2.3 billion.224
Apparently, this large amount of money circumventing the Russian
Federation struck a chord with the government, and in an attempt to attract direct
investment by providing greater protection for shareholders, the Russian
government amended JSC Law in 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2006.22 5  Although Russia purports that these rounds of amendments have
increased shareholder protections, in reality they have not gone far enough and
Russia must address three problems prior to enacting additional amendments to
JSC Law.
226
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE PROBLEMS THAT RUSSIA MUST ADDRESS
BEFORE ENACTING ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO JSC LAW
After the 1998 financial crisis Russian companies realized that foreign
capital is therapeutic to ailing business, and in order to assure investment, certain
standards of transparency, corporate governance, and accountability needed
drastic changes. 22 7 Change arrived and amongst Russia's many reforms came
the introduction of JSC Law.228  Under JSC Law, some say corporate
governance increased, while others would argue Russia has barely fulfilled its
potential. 229 Regardless, the Russian economy has continued to grow and with
its emergence on the global market, there has been a constant call for greater
shareholder protections. 2
30
also imposes an additional 15% defence tax on the Cyprus company if the
company does not distribute its income within two years. Because of the
defence tax, the fund would want to distribute the income of the Cyprus
company promptly each year.);
see also LOWTAX, supra note 220.
224. Langer et al., supra note 5, at 6.
225. See Lazareva et al., supra note 4, at 34.
226. Id.
227. Id.; see also WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., 98-578: THE RUSSIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS, CAUSES, AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (Digital Lib. of U.N.
Tex. 1999).
228. See Lazareva et al., supra note 4, at 33.
229. Andrei Gusev & Sergei Federov, Russia: Are Minority Shareholders Dying Out,
MANNHEIMER & SWARTLING, Mar. 22, 2008, http://www.mannheimerswartling.se/en/News/News-
arcive/RUSSIA-ARE-MINORITY-SHAREHOLDERS-DYING-OUT/; see also The Trouble with
Russia's Economy: Smoke and Mirrors, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2008, at 27, 28 [hereinafter
Smoke].
230. See Langer et al., supra note 5, at 6.
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In response to the call for protection of shareholders from the global
marketplace, Russian authorities amended JSC Law.23 1 The amendments to JSC
Law sought to provide greater protections to shareholders through stricter
corporate governance and by strengthening the rights around shareholder
agreements. 23 2  While the desire to provide protection for shareholders was
undoubtedly important to Russian legislators, the amount of money lost due to
offshore holding companies probably played an even greater role in the• • •233
additional protections afforded to shareholders. Consequently, the Russian
Federation rushed to amend JSC Law in 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
and 2006.2 34 The enactment of many of these amendments created additional
problems by undermining shareholder protections and made it clear that Russia's
structural problems make additional amendments frivolous and wasteful.
235
Nevertheless, the Russian Duma have ignored these consequences and proposed
an additional round of amendments to JSC Law that would strive to provide
additional protections to shareholders in the hope of increasing direct investment
into Russia.
236
The Russian Duma should not enact the current amendments to JSC
Law.237 They must first address three problems prior to the enactment of any
additional amendments to JSC Law.23 8 First, the elimination of preferred stock
voting rights has undermined private equity and increased hostile takeovers.
239
231. See Coco, supra note 187, at 183-85.
232. Id.
233. Wack et al., supra note 204, at 237 (explaining that since Russia has no limit on the amount
invested through private equity offshore and private equity is increasing, Russia needs to
implement changes or offshore investing will continue to grow unchecked).
234. Lazareva et al., supra note 4, at 33-34.
235. See id.; see also DELPHINE NOUGAYRtDE & GEORGY KALASHNIKOV, DLA PIPER, RUSSIA
CHAPTER OF THE IFLR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDE 2007, available at
http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/43fl be6f-6511-4al 1-9563-
2fe21 a37fa50/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d5f731 a 1-2fdO-49ba-a4b 1-
35a2d85d5256/RussiaChapteroP/2OIFLRCorporateMar2007.pdf.
236. Gusev et al., supra note 229.
237. See NOUGAYRtDE ET AL., supra note 235; see also Ajay Sud, The Legal Environment for
Asset-Backed Securitization in Russia, in EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTR. & DEV., LAW IN TRANSITION
2008 at 25-26 (explaining that there are already shortcomings within the legal framework and that
because of subprime lending crisis and transparency issues within Russia a few negative court
decisions, due to new legislation, could cause investors to lose confidence in the Russian Market);
Gusev et al., supra note 229 (explaining that the amendments to the JSC made in January of 2006
had shortcomings, namely, "restricts the rights of shareholders, . . . contradicts the
Constitution,... and contains a number of internal contradictions," and that its introduction will be
problematic for the Russian courts because of the issues that it raises).
238. NOUGAYREDE ET AL., supra note 235, at 25-26.
239. Lazareva et al., supra note 4, at 33-34.
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Second, shareholder agreements are unenforceable, and in the event of a
breached agreement, shareholders have no recourse within the Russian
Courts. 24  Third, rampant corruption still plagues Russia.24 1  Finally, the242
Russian Judiciary is a weak mechanism of enforcement. The Duma must
confront these problems before enacting additional amendments to JSC Law,
only then will private equity invest directly into Russian companies.
24 3
A. Problem 1: Shareholder agreements are unenforceable and in the event of a
breached agreement, shareholders have no recourse within the Russian
Courts
Although there are many nuances that distinguish the Russian civil law
system, it is evident from the many rounds of amendments to the JSC Law that
the protection of shareholders' rights should be of primary concern.244
However, courts often fail to protect shareholders' rights within shareholder
agreements. 245 The lack of protection arises from provisions within shareholder
agreements that are largely unenforceable within Russian Courts. 2 4 6  The
Russian Civil Code provides that only provisions and warranties pertaining to
the shares being acquired are enforceable. 247  Provisions contained in
agreements that pertain to the shareholders and not the shares, such as veto
rights, drag along rights, tag along rights, puts/calls, and other warranties, are
likely unenforceable. 2 48 Thus, rather than directly invest in Russian companies,
limited partnerships invest through offshore holding companies to ensure that
240. Alexei Knyazhev & Alexei Zakharko The Use of Warranties in Russian M&A
Transactions, 18 RUSS./EuRASIA EXECUTIVE GUIDE 7, 7-8 (2008).
241. Jim Argalas et al., Russian Capital Markets, GLOBAL INITIATIVES IN MGMT., KELLOGG
GRADUATE SCH. OF MGMT., Apr. 17, 2001, at 18.
242. KENICHI OSUGI, OECD/ WORLD BANK CORP. GOVERNANCE ROUNDTABLE FOR Russ., How
SHOULD WE ENFORCE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS IN RUSSIA?: OVERHAULING THE SELF-
ENFORCING MODEL OF CORPORATE LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 2 (2000); see also Andrei
Yakolev, Evolution of Corporate Governance in Russia: Government Policy vs. Real Incentives of
Economic Agents, 16 TAYLOR & FRANCIS J. 387,396 (2004).
243. See Argalas et al., supra note 241, at 18-19.
244. See Lazareva et al., supra note 4, at 34 (explaining that if the Russian government is going
to take the time to make amendments in 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2006, and are
currently considering more amendments then it is a reasonable inference that shareholder
protections should be of primary concern); see also David Wack, Minority Shareholder Rights
Under Russian Law, 3 INT'L J. OF DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 317, 317 (2006).
245. Rose, supra note 190; see also Wack, supra note 244, at 317.
246. Rose, supra note 190.
247. Knyazhev et al., supra note 240, at 7-8.
248. Id.
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these provisions are enforceable. 24 9 Furthermore, in the event the agreement is
breached, offshore jurisdictions allow for remedies that the Russian Civil Code
does not provide. 25  Both problems are illustrated and analyzed throughout the
example below.
Imagine that a U.S. limited partnership (USLP) has decided to invest in a
Russian private company (RussianCo). Assume that the shareholders of
RussianCo are the majority shareholders, and shareholders of USLP hold the
minority in the transaction. In structuring the deal, RussianCo and USL.P enter
into a shareholder agreement. The section of the agreement that deals with
representation of the shareholders on the board of directors stipulates that
RussianCo (holding 70 % of the company shares) have three representatives and
that USLP (holding 30% of the company shares) have two representatives, and
that regardless of the outcome of the vote at a shareholders meeting, each group
of shareholders will be represented by the terms of the shareholder agreement.
The terms of the shareholder agreement therefore are contrary to the terms set
forth in the company charter, which in Russia must conform with standards that
correspond to those in JSC Law.
252
Subsequently, at the annual shareholder meeting between RussianCo and
USLP, the majority shareholders of RussianCo decide to elect five of their
representatives to the board of directors and refuse to recognize the claim by
USLP that according to the shareholder agreement, two of their representatives
are supposed to be on the board of directors. 253 While it would seem the terms
of the shareholder agreement should protect the right of USLP to have two seats
on the board of directors, this may not be the case.25  Under Article 48.4 of JSC
Law, "the board of directors of a company is elected by a simple majority of
shareholder votes."'255  Therefore, regardless of the terms that USLP and
RussianCo have agreed upon in the shareholder agreement, because of Russia's
249. See id.; see also Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect
Financial Transactions?: The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, 224 Q. J. OF ECON. 223, 224
(2005) (noting that "[p]arties cannot easily undo deficiencies of the law through private
transactions if the legal system does not enforce certain types of contracts" since Russia does not
enforce shareholder agreements limited partnerships would rather structure their shareholder
agreement where it will be enforceable).
250. Knyazhev et al., supra note 240, at 7-8.
25 1. Peter A. Maximov, Enforceability of Shareholder Agreements under Russian Law: Certain
Aspects of the Existing Problem, SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY, June 30, 2006,
http://www.lawfirm.ruL/article/pfint.php?id=73.
252. Id. (inferring that under article 48.4 of JSC Law, "the board of directors is elected by a
simple majority of shareholder votes" and the company's charter must conform to the laws of the
JSC, therefore the company can only elect a board of directors by a simple majority vote).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
2008]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
civil system and its strict interpretation governing statutes, the candidates elected
by a simple majority of shareholders will comprise the board of directors. 256
In the U.S., shareholders can enter into a shareholder agreement that can
change the voting threshold needed to elect an individual to the board of
directors. 257 However, this is not possible in Russia because "[u]nder Russian
law, provisions contained in any agreement that conflict with Russian
legislation... are unenforceable." 258  Consequently, even though RussianCo
breached the shareholder agreement with USLP, it elected the board of directors
pursuant to the requirements of JSC Law by a simple majority and therefore
elected the board.
The question then arises whether USLP will be able to protect the rights
agreed upon in the shareholder agreement through legal enforcement in Russia's
judicial system. 260 In the U.S., "[m]ost shareholder agreements call for a remedy
of specific performance in the event a given [shareholder] does not vote in
accordance with the agreement." 26' Thus, the shareholders of USLP decide that
they have two options: try to have the shareholder meeting annulled or sue for
breach of contract.
262
The first option for the shareholders of USLP is to have the decision made
by RussianCo at the shareholder meeting annulled. 263 Under the Amended JSC
Law, the basis for annulling decisions made at shareholder meetings can only
occur if the decision contradicts JSC Law, another law of the Russian
Federation, or the company charter.264 In the case of the decision by RussianCo
to disregard the provision of the shareholder agreement that allows USLP to
256. Id.
257. See Langer et al., supra note 5, at 6.
258. Christopher Rose, Comment: Doing Deals in Russia-5 Useful Tips, BUSINESS NEW EUROPE,
June 11, 2008, http://businessneweurope.eu/story1087; see also Maximov, supra note 251; see
also PAUL E. RUBIN, PROMISES, PROMISES: CONTRACTS IN RUSSIA AND OTHER POST-COMMUNIST
ECONOMIES 11-31 (1997).
259. Rose, supra note 258, at 6.
260. Id.; see also RUBIN supra note 258, at 11-31.
261. JEFFERY J. HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE 13 (2004).
262. Rose, supra note 150, at 9.
263. Id.; see also Maximov supra note 251.
264. Maximov, supra note 251 (explaining that decisions for annulling shareholder meeting
decisions are found in Article 49.7, where:
[a] shareholder shall have the right to bring action in court to challenge a
decision made at a general meeting of shareholders in violation of this Federal
Law, other laws of the Russian Federation, the charter of the company, in the
event he was not present at the general meeting of shareholders or voted against
the adoption of such decision, and such decision violates his rights and lawful
interests.)
(emphasis omitted).
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have two seats on the board of directors, this clearly does not violate JSC Law or
the company's charter. 265 Furthermore, it does not violate other laws of the
Russian Federation. 266 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that USLP would have
success in attempting to have the decision at the shareholder meeting
annulled.
267
The second option for the USLP shareholders is to sue for breach of
contract. 26 8 The best-case scenario in a suit for breach of contract for the USLP
shareholders in the context of a private equity transaction would be specific
performance of the shareholder agreement. 269 The provisions that guide courts
relating to specific performance of an agreement are located under Article 396 of
the Civil Code. 270 Under this Article, if a shareholder commits a total breach of
the shareholder agreement, as RussianCo committed against USLP, then they
may pay damages to release themselves from the specific performance of their
contractual obligation, "unless otherwise provided by law or contract.271
This would seem to be a case that could fit into the "unless otherwise
provided by contract" caveat.2 72 Accordingly, USLP should be able to attempt
to assert the rights it has contracted for in the agreement by obtaining specific
performance regarding its right to have two members on the board of directors,S 273
in lieu of payment of damages. However, it is unlikely that a Russian Court
265. Id. (explaining that under Russian Law a company's charter must conform with JSC Law
and thus it can be inferred that if the decision by RussianCo does not violate JSC Law then it also
does not violate the company charter).
266. Id. (explaining that under the
Joint Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and
the High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation No. 4/8 'On Certain Issues
Relating to the Application of the Federal Law "On Joint Stock Companies,"'
which clarifies for the lower courts the practical aspects of application of JSC
Law... JSC Law does not specify a breach of a shareholder agreement as
grounds for invalidating a decision of the general meeting).
267. Id.
268. Rose, supra note 150, at 9-10; see also Maximov, supra note 251; NOUGAYRIDE ET AL.,
supra note 235, (explaining that where if a shareholder had a right of claim by contract it is likely
that in certain instances, such as director liability that this right would have no legal effect in
Russia).
269. Maximov, supra note 251.
270. Id. (noting that under Article 396 of the Civil Code courts are guided using 2 provisions,
first "[t]he payment of a penalty and damages in the event of inadequate performance of an
obligation will not release the debtor from specifically performing the obligation, unless otherwise
provided by law or contract"; and second, "[t]he payment of damages in the event of a failure to
perform an obligation and the payment of a penalty for such failure to perform will release the
debtor from specifically performing the obligation, unless otherwise provided by law or contract").
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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would provide this right because under Russia's Civil Law system, courts are
only able to provide remedies explicitly permitted by statute. 274  There is no
piece of Russian legislation that explicitly or even closely provides for this type
of remedy. 27 5  Therefore, it is unlikely that USLP would be able to obtain
specific performance under a suit for breach of contract. 276 Thus, even where
the Amended JSC has attempted to create avenues for shareholders to have
recourse, the Russian Court System does not always provide for the remedy
needed.
277
Before making additional amendments, Russia must change the Russian
Civil Code to allow current JSC Law to be enforced. 27 8  It is wasteful for
Russian legislators to amend JSC Law when, under the existing framework,
already established provisions are unenforceable. 279  Of primary importance
should be the protection of the rights agreed upon in the shareholder
agreement. 28  This must include all of the rights, regardless of whether they
pertain to the shares being acquired or the shareholders themselves.
281
Furthermore, in the event of a breach of the agreement, shareholders must have
faith that the legal framework will ensure that a court will protect their rights.
282
In mature markets throughout the world, shareholder agreements allow for a
remedy of specific performance in the event that shareholders' rights are not
enforced. 283 Thus, Russia must amend its Civil Code to allow for the annulment
of decisions that violate the shareholder agreement or allow parties to sue for
breach of contract.2 84 In the event parties sue for breach of contract, Russia must
amend its Civil Code to expand the remedies available to shareholders.
285
Unless Russia allows for provisions within shareholder agreements to be
274. Rose, supra note 150, at 10; see also Maximov, supra note 251.
275. Maximov, supra note 251 (explaining that for a Russian Court to be able to provide this
type of specific performance a statute would have to explicitly state something close to where one
party has breached a shareholder agreement, the court will provide the remedy of specific
performance in the form of compelling the breaching party to vote in line with the breached
agreement).
276. Rose, supra note 150, at 10 (explaining that "[i]n Russia the form of specific performance
granted by a court must be expressly permitted by law."); see also COMM. ON NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS, AM. BAR ASS'N, INTERNATIONAL STOCK PURCHASE ACQUISITIONS 584 (John
Grossbauer et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter CNA].
277. Knyazhev et al., supra note 240, at 7-8; see also Maximov, supra note 251.
278. See id.
279. Id.; see also Gusev et al, supra note 229.
280. Rose, supra note 190.
281. See Knyazhev et al., supra note 240, at 7-8.
282. Maximov, supra note 251; see also RUBIN, supra note 258, at 11-31 to 11-38.
283. See HAAS, supra note 261, at 12-13.
284. See Rose, supra note 150, at 9.
285. Knyazhev et al., supra note 240, at 7-8.
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enforceable and provides enforcement of these rights, private equity will
continue to invest through offshore holding companies, and direct investment
into Russia will never reach its maximum capacity.
286
B. Problem 2: Corruption
"When asked to describe the people of Russia in a single word, Gavril
Romanovich Derzhavin, a Russian Scholar simply said "- voruyut - (they)
steal."287 Derzhavin gave this description of Russians during the 18th Century,
and as disappointing as it may seem, the world's investment community still
largely regards the description as adequate. 288 In a survey by C5289 and Squire,
Sanders, Dempsey L.L.P., private equity firm managers indicated that the
primary reason for writing off deals in Russia was untrustworthy partners,
specifically shareholders within the prospective Russian companies.
Consequently, corruption between partner shareholders in prospective
Russian companies greatly reduces direct investment from U.S. private equity
into Russia. 29 1  In the context of private equity, the investment is highly
structured until exit, and cooperation between the limited partnership and the
investee company is particularly important in order to maximize profit and
performance. Although there should be a shareholder agreement to ensure
cooperation between the parties, 293 as explained in the previous section,
shareholder agreements are largely unenforceable in Russia. 294 In addition to the
problem of the unenforceability of shareholder agreements, rampant corruption
286. Id.; see also Jason Corcoran, 2008 Seen Year that Big Private Equity Hits Russia, Bus.
NEW EUR., Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.businessneweurope.eu/story.php?s=838 (showing that many
of the large international private equity firms are contemplating increasing investments into
Russia, but are hesitant to invest larger amounts of money because of a lack of an enforcement
mechanism, such as an enforceable shareholder agreement).
287. See Argalas et al., supra note 241, at 18.
288. Id.
289. CIS, supra note 202.
290. Id.
291. See USDC, supra note 6 (noting that "[i]n December, First Deputy Prosecutor General
Alexander Buksman estimated that corruption costs the country $240 billion annually and
disclosed that prosecutors had uncovered 28,000 cases of corruption among state officials in the
first eight months of 2006.").
292. Beddow, supra note 130, at 7; see Raj M. Desai & Itzhak Goldberg, The Vicious Circles of
Control: Regional Governments and Insiders in Privatized Russian Enterprises 1, 8 (World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2287, 2000).
293. See Bloom et al., supra note 11.
294. Rose, supra note 190.
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within Russia's judicial system also contributes to the problem 29 5 and is
detrimental to shareholder rights and direct investment.
296
Corruption is a pervasive problem for the judiciary at both the local andS 297. ...
federal levels within Russia. Locally within the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation's eighty-eight subunits, bribes often influence local business
decisions in disputes that arise between shareholders of a private equity firm and
company shareholders. 29 8 Within the eighty-eight subunits that comprise the
Russian Federation, local leaders often nominate local judges for a bribe.299
Local Russian Courts are often biased in their interpretation of Russian
legislation against foreign investors. 30 0  Consequently, when a dispute arises
with a foreign entity, such as a private equity firm, many times the local judges
protect the Russian company and its leaders.
30 1
Russian bureaucracy further exacerbates the problem. 302  If an entity
accuses a judge of corruption, a regional qualification board must vote by a two-
thirds majority to take disciplinary action to have a judge removed.30 3 However,
upon receiving a complaint concerning a judge, if the board is too busy they may
authorize the chairman of the court where the judge presides to evaluate the
complaint. 304 It is common for the case to die while in review, as the chairman
will assert that the judge in question has been warned. 305  If, however, the
chairman reviews the complaint and decides to take action or as in the former
case, where a qualification board votes by a two-thirds majority to take action
against the judge, then criminal charges can be brought only if the local
Prosecutor General approves the criminal proceedings against a judge. 306 As
expected this occurrence rarely happens, in part due to the various layers of
295. Bloom et al., supra note 11.
296. See USDC, supra note 6; see also ANDERS ASLUND, RUSSIA'S CAPITALIST REVOLUTION:
WHY MARKET REFORM SUCCEEDED AND DEMOCRACY FAILED 186 (2007) (showing that where
there is poor corporate governance and no enforcement system because of corruption then partners
will be less willingly to invest).
297. See id.
298. Bloom et al., supra note 11.
299. Id.; see also ASLUND, supra note 296, at 262 (explaining that in Russia bribery is often the
main factor in landing a top job, and that "[i]t is hardly an exaggeration in Russia to say that
everything is for sale in Russia. People pay bribes... to land a good job.").
300. See Bloom et al., supra note 11.
301. See Peter H. Solomon Jr., Judicial Power in Russia: Through the Prism of Administrative
Justice, 38 L. & SOc'Y REV. 549, 556 (2004).
302. Bernard Black, Shareholder Robbery, Russian Style, INST. SHAREHOLDER SERVS. ISSUE
ALERT, Oct. 1998, at 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-510123.
303. Bloom et al., supra note 11.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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bureaucracy but also because of a principle from the Soviet past ingrained in
many Russian minds, that one must protect one's own. 307 Accordingly, it is very
uncommon for a judge on the federal or local level to face removal. 30 8
In addition to the problems within the judiciary, there are problems with the
governance of the system itself.30 9 Federally, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the Federal Security Service investigate bribery and corruption within the
judiciary. 3 1  However, both oversight entities are themselves perceived to be
corrupt. 3 1  Although the Russian government has continually assured the global
community the fight against corruption is a top priority,3 12 the corruption-
monitoring group Transparency International estimates that corruption has
increased seven times since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2001.313
Internationally, investors' perceptions of Russian corruption magnify the
problem and investment suffers. 3 14 In the context of private equity, both the
investor's and the private equity firm's primary concern is their investment in
the prospective Russian company and whether their rights as shareholders can be
adequately protected by the Russian Courts. 315 Because of the high levels of
corruption and lack of protection provided by the judiciary in the interest of their
investors, private equity firms structure deals using offshore companies
governed by U.S. laws. 3 6 As a result, Russia misses a vast amount of money
that circumvents the Russian system through offshore holding companies.
317
307. Id.; see Judge et al., supra note 13, at 307 (explaining that although there are formal rules
that judges must abide by, because of their Soviet past the informal rules often carry more weight
than the formal ones).
308. See Bloom et al., supra note 11.
309. See USDC, supra note 6.
310. See id.
311. Id.
312. Michael Mainville, Bribery Thrives as Big Business in Putin's Russia, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Jan. 2, 2007, at Al.
313. Id.; see also ASLUND, supra note 354, at 272 (noting that "corruption, which declined
during Putin's first years of structural reforms, started rising with the renationalization drive after
2004").
314. Mainville, supra note 312, at Al (noting that "[iln a Gallup poll of 101 countries, released
on Dec. 5, [2008] Russia was perceived as the third-most corrupt nation, after Morocco and
Romania") (text added); see also Fianna Jesover, Corporate Governance in the Russian
Federation: The Relevance of the OECD Principles on Shareholder Rights and Equitable
Treatment, 9 PRACTICED-BASED PAPERS BLACKWELL PUBs 79, 79 (2001) (explaining that
corruption in the Russian legal framework "have resulted in a general climate of uncertainty and
widespread opportunism, which had a negative impact on investment").
315. Mainville, supra note 312, at Al.
316. See Russia: Digest, supra note 7, at 1.
317. See USDC, supra note 6; see also Langer et al., supra note 5, at 6.
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In order to increase direct investment it is apparent that Russia must first
confront the rampant corruption in its judiciary before making additional
amendments to JSC Law. Judges must be held accountable for their
actions.3 19 Although it seems as though oversight should come from the federal
level through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Service,
this already has proven ineffective. 32  This is partially due to the sheer size of
the Russian Federation, and the inability of the federal entities to provide
oversight to courts within eighty-eight separate subunits. 321
Therefore, Russia should implement changes at the local levels. First,
judges should not serve the subunit where they receive their nomination. 323
Instead, they should be placed and serve in a different subunit. 324 This would
help to alleviate local bias against foreigners and not allow local leaders and
businessmen to manipulate judges they have nominated. 325 Second, if an entity
accuses a judge of corruption, instead of requiring a two-thirds majority vote by
the regional qualification board, the voting requirement should be a simple
326
majonty. This would not only ease the voting threshold required to take
action against corrupt judges, but it would also make disciplinary action to have
a judge removed more efficient.32 7 Finally, if a regional qualification board is
too busy to hear the complaint against a judge, they should not be able to
authorize the chairman of the court where the judge presides to evaluate the
complaint. There is too great a chance for corruption in this case. 328 Instead, the
complaint against the judge should be heard either by another impartial regional
qualification board or by a chairman of another court outside of the particular
judge's subunit.329
C. Problem 3. The Judiciary
It is obvious to U.S. private equity firms investing in Russia that corruption
may be a potential obstacle within the judiciary, 33 but an equally serious, yet
318. See USDC, supra note 6; see also Lemer et al., supra note 249, at 223 (noting that there is a
relationship between increasing financial markets and a strong legal system).
319. See Osugi, supra note 242, at 6.
320. See USDC, supra note 6.
321. See Russia: Digest, supra note 7, at 2.
322. See id.
323. Solomon, supra note 301, at 552.
324. See Bloom et al., supra note 11.
325. Solomon, supra note 301, at 552.
326. See Bloom et al., supra note 11.
327. See id.
328. Id.
329. Solomon, supra note 301, at 552.
330. See USDS, supra note 9; see also Bloom et al., supra note 11.
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less apparent threat to investment is the differences in legal systems between the
United States and Russia.3 31 This is largely a result of Russia having a civil law
system3 32 where statutes are more important than precedent. 333 In resolution of
disputes, judges interpret legislation rather than looking to earlier
jurisprudence. In their interpretation of legislation, judges take a literal
approach and often are not concerned with the substance of a case. 335 U.S.
limited partnerships are often accustomed to a common law approach to
commerce and find the interpretation of Russian laws by courts to be
inconsistent. 336 Ironically, Russian businessmen also find the web of conflicting
laws and their interpretation to be inconsistent. 337 This is due to a number of
reasons.
First, during the 1990s, there was a proliferation of legal reform in the
Russian Federation. Most legislation is quite recent; consequently, judges are
still becoming acclimated to the new statutes. 338 It does not help the situation
that there have been new amendments to JSC Law in 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004, and 2006. 339 Thus, weak enforcement is partially due to the failure
of existing Russian judiciary to keep pace with the many amendments.3 40
Second, the laws are complex and multilayered.3 4 1 This is not conducive to
consistency where the Russian Federation is comprised of eighty-eight subunits,
twenty-one republics, forty-nine regions, ten autonomous districts, six territories,
Moscow, St. Petersburg, and one autonomous region. 342 Furthermore, each of
the eighty-eight subunits are competent to enact legislation, but must follow
matters that fall under federal exclusive jurisdiction. Moreover, many judges
come from the Soviet era of Communist economic ideas and this makes it
especially difficult to master the complex issues associated with laws dealing
with economic statutes and corporate governance. 344 Even where a judge has an
331. Rose, supra note 190.
332. See USDS, supra note 9.
333. CNA, supra note 276, at 584; see also Russia: Digest, supra note 7, at 1.
334. See Russia: Digest, supra note 7, at 1.
335. Id.
336. See CNA, supra note 276, at 584.
337. See Smoke, supra note 229, at 27-29.
338. See Russia: Digest, supra note 7, at 1.
339. Lazareva et al., supra note 4, at 34.
340. OECD, supra note 7, at 16.
341. See Russia: Digest, supra note 7, at 6.
342. See id. at 2.
343. Id.
344. OECD, supra note 7, at 16; see also Lerner et al., supra note 249, at 226, 228 (noting that
Judges may have a hard time dealing with complex contract features tied to control and ownership
of shares and may be "suspicious and indeed hostile to such transactions").
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understanding of the economic concepts, it is likely that they have not become
fully trained in the law as many newly appointed judges do not complete their
education before being appointed to the judiciary.345
In addition to the problems within the judiciary, the infrastructure
surrounding it is problematic as well. 346 There is a general lack of resources
provided for the judicial system in Russia. 347 Funds are often not available for
fundamental functions within the courts such as providing payment of jury
members, postage, and calling witnesses.34 8  In addition, many courts have
trouble functioning properly because of understaffing due to the inadequate
funding. 349 Thus, even if an investor who brings suit finds an impartial judge
who understands the law, there is no guarantee that the judge will have the
infrastructure in place to see that their ruling is carried out.
35 0
There are three key changes that Russia must implement to strengthen its
judiciary.35 1 First, it must increase funding to the judiciary. 35  This will serve
two purposes. 353 It will allow the judiciary to have the infrastructure in place to
function properly, and judges will be less likely to take bribes if they receive a
greater wage. 354  In addition, by receiving a higher wage the judges should
receive more respect.355  This will not only create judges who value their
positions and would not want to jeopardize their future by taking bribes, but also
will increase competition for judicial candidates in the future. 356
The second key is that Russia must increase consistency in its judges'
rulings35 7 within the aforementioned eighty-eight subunits, twenty-one republics,
forty-nine regions, ten autonomous districts, six territories, Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and one autonomous region, which together make up the Russian
Federation.358 While this seems daunting, if Russia prohibits each of the eighty-
eight subunits from enacting their own legislation and follows a true civil law
345. OECD, supra note 7, at 17.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 17; see also Solomon, supra note 301, at 552.
348. OECD, supra note 7, at 17.
349. Id. at 16.
350. Id. at 17.
351. See id.
352. Id. at 17,
353. OECD, supra note 7, at 17.
354. Solomon, supra note 301, at 552.
355. OECD, supra note 7, at 17.
356. Id.
357. See Solomon, supra note 301, at 562.
358. See Russia: Digest, supra note 7, at 2.
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.... 359
system under exclusive federal jurisdiction, then there will inevitably be more
consistency in judges' rulings.360
The third and most important key is that Russia must not enact any
additional amendments. 36 1  JSC Law is complex and multilayered. 362  The
Russian Legislature has made amendments in seven out of the last ten years.
3 63
Judges need time to become accustomed to new statutes.364  The last thing
judges from a post-communist era in an already ineffective system need is a new
set of economic-based legislation.365  Thus, it is in the best interest of the
judiciary, and Russia for that matter, not to enact additional amendments to JSC
Law.
366
VI. CONCLUSION
Private equity investments will continue to increase in Russia.
367
Additional amendments to JSC Law will neither increase direct investment into
Russian companies nor provide additional protections for shareholders. 368  In
order to increase shareholder protections, Russia must amend the Civil Code to
allow for provisions within shareholder agreements to be enforceable.
369
Furthermore, it must expand the remedies available to parties when shareholders
breach agreements. 37  Finally, and most importantly, Russia must confront
corruption within its judiciary before enacting additional amendments.37'
Although daunting, the best strategy for Russia is to reform its judiciary at the
local levels. 372  Until these changes are made, U.S. limited partnerships will
continue to invest through offshore holding companies, and Mother Russia will
continue to lose rubles.
373
359. See id. at 5.
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